Squadrito: Commentary

more violence to a human's plans than it would to the
totality of things an animal would want to do. One
should therefore prefer the use of animals over humans
in freedom-restricting research. The death of a human,
he says, thwarts more interests, and more important or
central interests, than the death of an animal. He
presents no evidence for these contentions, does not
tell us what sort of animals humans are being compared
to (except birds and dogs) and adds a value judgment
that does not follow even if the premises that humans
have more interests is true.
That human plans or interests are more important
and central than animal interests is a statement that I
am at a loss to comprehend. DeGrazia is careful to
point out that the premise is "generally true," Le., that
some humans, e.g., "the very old, the retarded, do not
always have plans that are so badly thwarted by
captivity, while birds may be completely frustrated." 1
am not sure whether this type of theorizing involves
empirical variables or exactly what DeGrazia would
propose to do on the basis of empirical research into
the thwarting of freedom. Do we construct a hierarchy
ofresearch animals based on the frustration ofcaptivity?
Do we select an elderly person or a retarded person
mther than a bird? Do we select by how important we
think a person's or animal's plans are? This may be
non-speciesist, but I have never understood how
philosophers can be comfortable with such a position.
DeGrazia asks the sceptic to consider all the things
she wants to do in the next fIve days. 1 take it as far
from obvious that humans, in general, do more various
kinds of things than animals. More than half of the
world's human population is so poor that they have very
few plans other than seeking food, shelter, and medical
care. They do not have freedom of mobility, freedom
to choose what, or whether, they will eat. Most domestic
dogs and cats have a "richer" life than most humans.
Are we to conclude that these people should be used as
experimental subjects rather than such animals?
DeGrazia indicates that this type of objection may not
be credible. By "humans," he says, "I mean normal
humans." Although he does not carefully define
"normal human," the sick, the starving, the elderly, the
retarded, and the handicapped would probably not
qualify as "normal." I fmd it highly objectionable to
conclude that "normal" people have a higher moral
status than those deemed not normal.
The life of domestic dogs is usually compared to the
life of normal humans. Captivity, says DeGrazia, would
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Professor DeGrazia argues that (1) we may give the
interests of humans and animals equal considemtion,
(2) that this considemtion does not entail that humans
and animals have equal moml status, and (3) that
humans do have higher moral status than animals. He
concludes that the use of nonhuman animals in research
is ethically justified. His position does not differ
significantly from that of Frey. Both avoid the
appearance of speciesism by providing a supposed
objective criterion of moral worth. Both appeal to
intuition to support such a criterion.
I find DeGrazia's position implausible for three
reasons: fIrst, it cannot be put into practice; second,
intuitions differ and cannot be used as a ground for
assuming that humans are more worthy than animals;
and third, the plausibility of his view depends on
accepting a fmrnework that is generally destructive
oClife.
My comments will be restricted to two of his
contentions; frrst, that differences in moml status appear
with regard to the interest of freedom and second, that
differences in moral status appear most vividly with
respect to life. As he points out, this position is not
uncommon. Singer claims that the rejection of
speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal
worth. Most philosophers contend that human life is
more valuable than animal life, and that some animal
lives are more valuable than other animal lives.
DeGrazia contends that captivity would generally do
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generally do more violence "to a human's plans than it
would to the totality ofthings the dog would want to do,"
as though the dog were not already captive. Since, in
general, white males tend to do more various types of
important things than blacks and women, we might as
well conclude that they have a higher moral status.
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David DeGrazia
Let me briefly respond to Professor Squadrito's
thoughtful commentary on my paper. Space precludes
treating all of the objections, and I will honor none of
the ad hominem remarks. To begin, I did not conclude
that the use ofanimals in research is justified. The thesis
was conditional and took this form: If research that
harms animals is to be done at all, then such-and-such
is, generally, a reason to prefer the use of animals over
humans. For all I have asserted, Regan's view might
be right, for it is compatible with the claim that normal
humans and normal animals differ in moral status;
indeed, his view implies this thesis with respect to lifeinterests. The truth is that I think a range of views are
within reason and that each view within this range is
compatible with the theses I advance, but I do not know
which is correct
Additionally, to be precise, I did not even argue that
humans generally have greater moral status than
animals, but rather that there is good reason to think so.
This more modest claim is in keeping with my purposes,
because my major objectives are (1) to distinguish the
concepts ofequal consideration and equal moral status
and (2) to prove that the principle ofequal consideration
does not entail equality of moral status. These
objectives are accomplished if it is shown that there is
good reason to think there are differences in moral status
while assuming the principle of equal consideration. I
fmd it odd that Squadrito never comments on my two
major theses.
However, I do, in fact, believe that there are
differences in moral status. To deny this thesis is to
accept fairly staggering implications, e.g., that there is
no more reason, ethically, to save a human person in a
"lifeboat situation" than to save a trout-that, given an

We may deem some interests to be more important
than other interests, but I doubt that this is based on
any objective criterion. To consider our own interests
and opportunities more important and central in some
cosmic sense is an elitist position that I cannot defend.
To contend that normal people have a higher moral
status than people who are not normal, to refer to such
people as defective or as marginal cases, to contend
that some animals have a higher moral status than some
people, is, I think, the height of egotism. To suggest
that the interests of a normal dolphin may be more
important than those of an elderly, retarded human is
an affront to human dignity. To contend that this is all
very objective and based on detached reflection is to
fool ourselves; philosophers give a sceptical eye to
scientists who make such claims. That we are not
dealing with pure objectivity is evidenced by the
constant appeal to intuition.
DeGrazia points out that the intuition persists that
the killing of a human is more destructive of something
objectively valuable than the killing ofan animal. What
kind of intuition is this? My guess is that it is based on
a long history of speciesism, based primarily on our
desperate desire to be important and powerful in a
universe that cares as much about us as it does a flea.
The terms "higher moral status" and "higher value" are
usually connected to some capitalist idea ofproductivity
and usefulness to those in power. That our total
obsession with hierarchies and ranking is destructive
to all life has been demonstrated in numerous works.
Giving all sentient beings equal moral status would
not solve the ethical dilemmas with regard to extreme
cases. We are all worried about a philosophical framework which would throw us off a lifeboat. I would not
throw a human being overboard in favor of a dog, not
for DeGrazia's reasons, but simply because I selfIshly
value humans more. I do not believe that our choices
in these situations are justified by any ethical theory.
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